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1  INTRODUCTION  
  
Honourable Justices, Ladies and Gentlemen, before I embark on my paper I would like 
to quote the following words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu
1
 who describes human rights 
as "God-given, there simply and solely because we are human beings".  He further 
notes that:   
  
they were universal – everyone, just everyone whoever they might be, whether rich or 
poor, learned or ignorant, beautiful or ugly, black or white, man or woman, by the fact 
of being a human being had these rights. …. As a Christian I would add that each 
person was of infinite value because everyone had been created in the image of God.  
Each one was a God carrier and to treat any such person as if they were less than this 
was blasphemous, a spitting in the face of God.
2
  
  
 
Human Rights and the continuous transformation thereof in a Bill of fundamental 
enforceable rights have changed the face of South African society forever.  These 
rights guarantee each citizen equality, freedom and human dignity irrespective of race, 
colour, sex and the fact that they may be rich or poor.  The Constitution contains a Bill 
of Rights that addresses both civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights.  
Socio-economic rights in laymen's terms are rights placing an obligation on the state to 
act positively in favor of its citizens. These rights are also known as second generation 
-, welfare – or (and) red rights. They are specifically aimed at realizing the rights to 
access to housing, health-care, sufficient food and water, and social security of those in 
need.    
 
 
1   Daniel Y et al Universal Declaration: of Human Rights Fifty Years and Beyond xiii.  
2   Own emphasis.  
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It is necessary to make a few remarks as point of departure for this paper:   
  
• This project of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
3
 is aimed at an analysing the influence 
of political, socio-economic and cultural considerations on the Constitutional Court's 
interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights in order to develop practical 
guidelines for South African courts confronted with issues of a political, 
socio-economic and cultural nature.  
• My paper today is only aimed at the first step of this two-folded process namely, 
analysing the influence of political, socio-economic and cultural considerations on 
the Constitutional Court's interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights.  
• And particular the role of political, socio-economic and cultural factors in the 
decisions of the constitutional court with regard to socio-economic rights.  
• Of particular importance in South African Constitutional socio-economic jurisprudence 
(if there is such concept) are the Soobramoney-, Grootboom- and TAC cases.  
 
  
I have identified a number of important issues in these cases:  
Firstly the importance of interpretation strategies and the Interpretation clause
4
 in 
the Constitution.  
Secondly the movement from rationality to reasonableness.  
The 'core minimum entitlement'-approach.  
The doctrine of separation of powers.  
The internal limitations contained in sections 26(2) and 27(2).  
Finally the importance of the constitutional values and fundamental rights of human 
dignity and equality in the interpretation of socio-economic rights.  
 
 
 
 
3    Titled: "Politics, Socio-Economic Issues and Culture in Constitutional Adjudication"  
4    Section 39(1)(a) provides when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – (a) must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;  (b) must 
consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.  
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 2  BACKGROUND OF SOOBRAMONEY, GROOTBOOM AND TAC CASES  
  
2.1  The Soobramoney case (Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 
1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC))  
 Mr Soobramoney applied to the Durban High Court claiming that he had a right to 
receive renal dialysis treatment from the hospital in terms of section 27(3), which 
provides that no-one may be refused emergency medical treatment and section 11, the 
right to life of the 1996 Constitution. The application was dismissed.  On appeal the 
Constitutional Court decided that this was not an emergency which called for immediate 
remedial treatment.  The Court held that the right could not mean that the treatment of 
terminal illnesses had to be prioritised over other forms of medical care such as 
preventative health care. It also held that the right not to be refused emergency medical 
treatment was independent from the right to life and had to be interpreted in the context 
of the availability of health services generally.  The Court went on to consider whether 
Mr Soobramoney ought to receive dialysis treatment at a state hospital in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitution, which entitle everyone to have access to health 
care services provided by the state.
5
   
  
2.2  The Grootboom case (The Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC))  
  
Mrs Grootboom was one of a group of 510 children and 390 adults living in appalling 
circumstances in Wallacedene informal settlement. They then illegally occupied nearby 
land earmarked for low-cost housing but were forcibly evicted: their shacks were 
bulldozed and burnt and their possessions destroyed. Their places in Wallacedene had 
been filled and in desperation they settled on its sports field and in an adjacent 
community hall. This case raises the state's obligations under section 26 of the 
Constitution, which gives everyone the right of access to adequate housing, and section 
28(1)(c), which affords children the right to shelter. It concerns questions about the 
enforceability of social and economic rights.  
5    Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution: "Everyone has a right to have access to health care services…"  
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2.3  The TAC case (Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign 
and others CCT8/02 (5 July 2002))  
  
In the most recent cases dealing with socio-economic rights, Treatment Action 
Campaign v Minister of Health
6
 in the High Court and Minister of Health v Treatment 
Action Campaign
7
 in the Constitutional Court, the issue of government's duty to provide 
HIV positive pregnant women with anti-retroviral drugs to lower the risk of mother to 
child transmission
8
 of the virus during childbirth was dealt with by the court.  
  
3 SOME REMARK ON THESE CASES  
3.1  Soobramoney –case  
  
The court held that a court would be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in 
good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to 
deal with such matters. The majority judgement places great emphasis on the 
qualification of available resources:
9
  
 
What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations imposed on the state by sections 
26 and 27 in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water and social security are 
dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the corresponding rights 
themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources.  Given this lack of resources and the 
significant demands on them that have already been referred to, an unqualified obligation to 
meet these needs would not presently be capable of being fulfilled.  This is the context within 
which section 27(3) must be construed.
10
  
  
Even authoritative writers like De Waal, Currie en Erasmus
11
 remark that:  
  
In the absence of available state resources, the failure of the state to address socio-economic 
rights is therefore not a violation of the rights.  However, should resources become available, it 
will be difficult for the state to justify its failure to devote those resources to the fulfilment of the 
rights.  
  
6    Case number: 21182/2001 Transvaal Provincial Division.  
7    CCT8/02 (5 July 2002).  
8    Henceforth referred to as MTCT.   
9   1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC) par 11.  The Government of the Republic of  South Africa and Others v Grootboom  
     and Others 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC); also see Ngwena 2000 SAPL 14. 
10.  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC) par 11.  Also quoted by the  
Constitutional court in the case The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others CCT 11/00 of 4 October 2000 par 46.  Own emphasis.  
11  The Bill of Rights Handbook 423.  
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It is clear when reading the case that the court considers political and socio-economic 
factors when deciding the Soobramoney case. The court is extremely careful not to 
interfere with the political decision making processes of government and especially with 
the health authorities.
12
  Furthermore the court expressly states that the government 
does not have the socio-economic resources to provide tertiary level health care on 
request to all those in need thereof.    
  
This limitation of resources has the result that the court sees it as a justifiable limitation 
on the almost absolute right to life, which is currently only seen as a negative right in 
South Africa.  As opposed to European
13
, Indian law
14
, and even African law
15
 where 
the right to life also has a positive dimension. It appears as if the court has the point of 
departure that if the right to life does have a positive dimension it will give rise to 
additional duties based on section 27.  For this reason the court did not do so.  Such a 
contextual approach can be criticised.  Context should not be used to limit rights.  
Context should be used to interpret rights.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12   See Ngwena 2000 SAPL 15 who remarks that judges prefers exercise self-restraint on account of the doctrine   
of separation of powers and view the matter as one that should be essentially be resolved by elected by 
politicians.    
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However in his minority judgement justice Sachs remarks:   
  
Courts are not the proper place to resolve the agonising personal and medical problems 
that underlie these choices.
16
  Important though our review functions are, there are areas 
where institutional incapacity and appropriate constitutional modesty require us to be especially 
cautious.  Our country’s legal system simply "cannot replace the more intimate struggle that 
must be borne by the patient, those caring for the patient, and those who care about the 
patient."  The provisions of the bill of rights should furthermore not be interpreted in a 
way which results in courts feeling themselves unduly pressurised by the fear of 
gambling with the lives of claimants into ordering hospitals to furnish the most 
expensive and improbable procedures, thereby diverting scarce medical resources and 
prejudicing the claims of others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13  Jansen van Rensburg  "Die beregtiging van die fundamentele reg op toegang tot sosiale sekerheid" [The 
adjudication of the fundamental right to access to social security] LL D-Thesis (RAU Johannesburg 2000) 54-55. 
Article 2 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which 
protects the right to life has been interpreted that the state has to protect a person's life. If the health care 
system does not comply with the minimum health care requirements the right to life has been violated.  See 
Tavares v France 12 September 1991 (unpublished) as referred by Pellonpää Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 865.  In the Tavares-case the applicant successfully proved that the respondent infringed on article 2 of 
the Convention after the applicant wife died in a French hospital due to complications she suffered after giving 
birth to their child.  See also Scheinin Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights 52.  
14  Jansen van Rensburg  "Die beregtiging van die fundamentele reg op toegang tot sosiale sekerheid" [The 
adjudication of the fundamental right to access to social security] LL D-Thesis (RAU Johannesburg 2000) 55. In 
Indian law the right to life is interpreted to include basic necessities to sustain a livelihood like food and clothing 
(Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Dehli 1981 2 SCR 516 op 529), the right to shelter 
(Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v Nawab Khan Gulab Khan & others 1977 AIR SC 152), the right to health 
care (Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v State of West Bengal 1996 AIR SC 2426), and the right to 
education (Jain v State of Karmataka 1992 3 SCC 666; Krishnan v State of Andhra Pradesh & other 1993 4 
LRC 234).  
15  Jansen van Rensburg  "Die beregtiging van die fundamentele reg op toegang tot sosiale sekerheid" [The 
adjudication of the fundamental right to access to social security] LL D-Thesis (RAU Johannesburg 2000) 55; 
Bennett Human Rights and the African Cultural Tradition 271.  
16  Again confirming the argument that judges prefers exercise self-restraint on account of the doctrine of separation  
     of powers.  See Ngwena 2000 SAPL 15.  
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The court in Soobramoney uses the purposive (contextual) method of interpretation to 
interpret section 27(3).  The court comes to the conclusion that the purpose of section 
27(3) is to ensure that nobody is refused medical treatment and that this section must 
be interpreted narrowly in order to serve the interests of the broader community.  
The court further uses the literal method of interpretation and looks at the negative 
wording of section 27(3) to come to the conclusion that section 27(3) is not applicable in 
the particular case.  
  
The minority judgement of justice Sachs refers to a number of important 
socio-economic factors which, according to him, are important in the holistic 
protection of the right to health care.  He
17
 remarks:  
  
Health care rights by their very nature have to be considered not only in a traditional 
legal context structured around the ideas of human autonomy but in a new analytical 
framework based on the notion of human interdependence.  A healthy life depends 
upon social interdependence:  the quality of air, water, and sanitation which the state 
maintains for the public good; the quality of one’s caring relationships, which are highly 
correlated to health; as well as the quality of health care and support furnished officially 
by medical institutions and provided informally by family, friends, and the community. 
As Minow put it: "Interdependence is not a social ideal, but an inescapable fact; the 
scarcity of resources forces it on us.  Who gets to use dialysis equipment? Who goes 
to the front of the line for the kidney transplant?"  
  
He further proposes the following approach:  
  
Traditional rights analyses accordingly have to be adapted so as to take account of the 
special problems created by the need to provide a broad framework of constitutional 
principles governing the right of access to scarce resources and to adjudicate between 
competing rights bearers.  When rights by their very nature are shared and 
inter-dependent, striking appropriate balances between the equally valid entitlements 
or expectations of a multitude of claimants should not be seen as imposing limits on 
those rights (which would then have to be justified in terms of section 36), but as 
defining the circumstances in which the rights may most fairly and effectively be 
enjoyed.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17   Par 54.  
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Sachs thus comes to the same conclusion as the majority judgement but moves 
outside of the traditional legal context and looks at the wider historical, current and 
future socio-economic factors which play a role in the right to health care and he 
balances these various factors and related needs to interpret the facts of the case in 
question. Such a wider and more holistic interpretation method where various 
socio-economic considerations are taken into account can be welcomed.  
  
3.2  Grootboom –case  
  
In the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) the court made no 
mention of reasonableness.  The court held that a court would be slow to interfere with 
rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities 
whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters. Before the judgement in the 
Grootboom case the conclusion can be reached that socio-economic rights can be 
enforced but that the court will be reluctant to interfere (except in extreme 
circumstances) with the functions of the legislative and executive branches of 
government.  The state thus has the discretion about when and how these rights 
should be realised. However after the judgement in the Grootboom case it appears that 
the court will not investigate the rationality and bona fides of the executive and the 
legislature, but will rather ask whether the socio-economic programme and the 
implementation thereof was reasonable.   
  
After the decision of the Constitutional court in the Grootboom-case it appears as if the 
court will no longer investigate the rationality and bona fides of the decisions of the 
legislative and executive authorities, but will rather investigate the reasonableness of 
the programme of the legislative and executive authority and the manner in which the 
programme is implemented.
18
   
 
 
18  Jansen van Rensburg  "Die beregtiging van die fundamentele reg op toegang tot sosiale sekerheid" [The 
adjudication of the fundamental right to access to social security] LL D-Thesis (RAU Johannesburg 2000) 
114-116.  See also Jansen van Rensburg L and Olivier MP "The Role and Influence of International Human 
Rights Instruments on South African Poverty Law" 2001 Law and Poverty IV - Moving towards International 
Poverty Law? Onati, Spain (to be published in Onati Proceedings by The Onati International Institute for the 
Sociology of Law.  
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 In the words of Pierre de Vos
19
:  
  
This apparent divergence between these two judgements might reasonably bring one 
to conclude that the Constitutional Court has had a change of heart about the 
importance – and the nature and scope –of the social and economic rights protected in 
the Bill of Rights.  
  
Of importance to this discussion is the manner in which the court interprets 
socio-economic rights and the factors which the court takes into account in the 
interpretation of such rights.  
  
The large-scale consideration of international law by the court is to be welcomed.   
  
The court notes that the facts of this case require a twofold method of interpretation.  
On the one hand a textual interpretation of these socio-economic rights and on the 
other hand a contextual approach so that these rights can be interpreted in their social 
and historical context is required.
20
  In respect of the latter approach, the court 
immediately notes:  
  
A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is 
to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality.  To be reasonable, 
measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the denial of the right 
they endeavour to realise.  Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose 
ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the 
measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right.  It may not be sufficient to 
meet the test of reasonableness to show that the measures are capable of achieving a 
statistical advance in the realisation of the right.  Furthermore, the Constitution 
requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern.  If the measures, 
though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most 
desperate, they may not pass the test.
21
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19  De Vos 2001 SAJHR 259 referring to Justice Chaskalson Third Bram Fischer memorial lecture in May 2000, just 
when the justices where sitting down writing the Grootboom decision.  See Chaskalson A 2000 SAJHR 193.  
20  Par 19.  
21  Own emphasis.  
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It is clear that the court makes use of the constitutional values in the Constitution to 
give content to socio-economic rights. (So-called dignitarian approach)  Denial of basic 
standards of living results in denial of a person's human dignity.  It can further be 
argued that the value of equality and the equality clause as contained in the Bill of 
Rights strives to repair the historical inequalities and injustices of the past and this can 
be deduced from the court's abovementioned comment.
22
  The court thus takes 
historical, socio-economic and political factors into account when giving content to 
socio-economic rights.  
  
When investigating an infringement of a specific socio-economic right, such 
investigation must take place in conjunction with all other socio-economic rights in 
the Bill of Rights.  The court emphasises that socio-economic rights must not be seen 
in isolation from one another.  They must thus be read within the Constitution as a 
whole.  The conclusion can be made that the state cannot realise all socio-economic 
rights immediately, and that the courts must keep this in mind and that the material 
needs of those persons who are the most vulnerable ought to enjoy priority.  Once 
again socio-economic factors are considered in relation to one each other.
23
  
  
It is not easy to determine infringement of a socio-economic right and each specific 
situation of alleged infringement must be evaluated on a case to case basis.
24
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22   Par 25: A programme which is aimed at the realisation of socio-economic rights which excludes a material 
section of the population will not be reasonable.  Compare the article of De Vos  2001 SAJHR 258 – 276 
where he argues that the rights in the Bill of Rights are interdependent and ……….  See Jansen van Rensburg  
"Die beregtiging van die fundamentele reg op toegang tot sosiale sekerheid" [The adjudication of the 
fundamental right to access to social security] LL D-Thesis (RAU Johannesburg 2000) 55-66.  Leckie makes 
the following observation with regard to the interdependence of civil and political rights on the one hand and 
socio-economic rights on the other hand: " Equality and non-discrimination form the basis of human rights law, 
and although generally associated with civil and political rights, these principles have always had pertinence to 
economic, social and cultural rights." Leckie 1998 Human Rights Quarterly 104-105.  
23   Par 43 of the Grootboom-case.  
24   Par 20 of the Grootboom-case.  See suggestion in chapter 3 par 3.3.  
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It is clear that the Constitutional court gives socio-economic rights a wider interpretation 
in the Grootboom-case than in the Soobramoney-case.  An attempt will be made to 
justify this difference in approach by the court.  The Grootboom-case dealt with a group 
of homeless people in desperate need while the Soobramoney-case dealt with one 
specific individual whose life was dependant on specialised health care.    
  
In the former case a vulnerable community in absolute need request the state to realise 
at least their basic needs.  As opposed to this, in the Soobramoney-case specialised 
medical care which places exceptionally high financial claims on the state is required.  
It can be argued that the state is in possession of limited resources and that these 
resources must be utilised in the best interest of the total population.  The courts will 
therefore more readily, where it appears that the state has not realised the basic needs 
of a vulnerable group, realise such basic needs of the group in question.  Where a 
specific individual request high cost tertiary medical care while a large section of the 
population in South Africa does not even have access to primary medical care, the 
courts will not grant help readily, or at all.  
  
3.3  TAC –case   
  
Above mentioned case deals with provision of anti-retroviral drugs to pregnant mothers 
that do not have the means to afford these drugs themselves.    
  
Section 27(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights determines that everyone has the right to access to 
medical care, including reproductive medical care.  Section 27(1)(a), like most other 
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights is limited by the following provision contained 
in section 27(2):  
 
the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures  
within its available resources  
to progressively realise these rights.  
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It is argued on behalf of the TAC that section 27(1) creates an independent right that is 
not dependant on section 27(2) which requires that state to realise this right 
progressively.  The court differs from this argument and interprets the relationship 
between sections 27(1) and 27(2) by looking at the language of the sections (textual 
method of interpretation).  The court notes that the fact that section 27(2) refers to 
"these rights" gives a clear indication that it is connected to section 27(1). The same can 
be said of sections 26(1) en (2).
25
  The court further refers to the Soobramoney and 
Grootboom –cases where this approach has already been followed.
26
  The court notes 
that even where the court makes use of a purposive method of interpretation it will 
come to the same conclusion in respect of the above.   
  
In line with the Grootboom decision, the court denies the existence of an international 
law principle of 'minimum core' or basic minimum realisation of every socio-economic 
right.  The court interprets this as part of the question as to whether the state had a 
reasonable programme to realise a socio-economic right.  The reason is described as 
follows by the court:  
  
It should be borne in mind that in dealing with such matters the court are not 
institutionally equipped to make the wideraging factual and political enquiries 
necessary for determining what the minimum core standards       should be nor for 
deciding how public revenues should most effectively be spent.  
  
The court further notes that a court is not in the position to make orders which can have 
social and economic consequences for the community.  The court thus exercises 
judicial constraint and according to the court, they focus on the traditional function of the 
courts and forbid themselves from interfering with executive and legislative decisions.  
In my opinion nothing prevents the court from giving instructions to executive 
and legislative authorities to start with a programme to identify the "minimum 
core" of each right.  Due to the fact that South Africa has signed and is in the process 
of ratifying the ICESCR.  
 
 
 
25  Par 30: These two subsections are textually linked.  
26  Par 29, 31 en 32.  
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4  CONCLUSION  
  
Interpretation clause in Constitution plays large role  
Political considerations  
Social and economic consideration – statistical information, health care plans, housing 
programmes  
Socio-economic circumstances in the country  
Letterknegtelik because court is afraid of infringing on the principle of separation of 
powers  
Contextuale – purposive even teologies  
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